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In any event, they both appear to be instances of a type of predictable,
everyday carelessness, within the bounds of "normal" use of a product,
which will not relieve suppliers from liability for a breach of warranty.
"Normal experience does not warrant the assumption that others will
always act prudently .... .. 57 The courts appear to be saying that
suppliers must therefore act accordingly.
Although neither sound reason nor authority exists for the
introduction of contributory negligence as an affirmative defense into
the warranty action, neither plaintiffs' nor defendants' counsel can
sensibly ignore the variety of devices courts use to obtain what often
appear to be equivalent results. The best argument against bringing
contributory negligence into warranty is simply that it is not needed.
WILLIAM

M.

BARR

PROBLEMS RESULTING FROM TAXATION OF
EMBEZZLED FUNDS
After fifteen years of judicial confusion, it is now settled that an
embezzler must pay federal income taxes on his ill-gotten gains. This
note deals with the developments leading to this judicial holding and
some resulting problems.
HISTORICAL BACKGROUND

Commissionerv. Wilcox
Prior to 1946 there was conflict among the decisions of the United
States circuit courts of appeal as to whether embezzled funds were
taxable income to the embezzler., In that year the United States Supreme Court granted certiorari2 in Commissioner v. Wilcox 3 to resolve
this conflict. The Court said that an embezzler receives money without
any bona fide claim of right and is at all times under an unqualified
duty and obligation to repay the money to his employer. It held,
therefore, that mere misappropriation of funds did not give rise to a
57. Green, Contributory Negligence and Proximate Cause, 6 N.C.L.
31 (1927).

REv.

3,

1. E.g., McKnight v. Commissioner, 127 F.2d 572 (5th Cir. 1942) (not taxable);
Kurrle v. Helvering, 126 F.2d 723 (8th Cir. 1942) (taxable).

2. 326 U.S. 701 (1945).
3. 327 U.S. 404 (1946).
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taxable gain in the year of embezzlement. Using a "claim of right"
test, the Court stated: 4
"A taxable gain is conditioned upon (1) the presence of a
claim of right to the alleged gain and (2) the absence of a
definite, unconditional obligation to repay or return that which
would otherwise constitute a gain."
The "claim of right" doctrine originated in North American
Oil Consolidated v. Burnet;5 it was utilized to determine in what
year a gain was taxable, not whether it was taxable. 6 This doctrine
has since been extensively applied by the courts," and its purpose
seems to be facilitation of orderly tax administration by maintaining
the integrity of the taxable year. 8 It was apparently used in Wilcox
to determine whether, not when, embezzled funds constituted taxable
income.
Rutkin v. United States
In Rutkin v. United States,9 decided six years after Wilcox, the
United States Supreme Court was faced with the question of the
taxability of funds gained by extortion rather than embezzlement.
In a five-to-four decision, the Court distinguished Wilcox on this
fact and held that money gained by extortion is taxable income to
the extortionist.2o Adopting an "economic value" test rather than
the "claim of right" test relied upon in Wilcox, the Court stated:'1
"An unlawful gain, as well as a lawful one, constitutes taxable
income when its recipient has such control over it that, as a
practical matter, he derives readily realizable economic value
from it."
The Rutkin decision, superimposed on that of Wilcox, resulted
4. Id. at 408. (Emphasis added.)
5. 286 U.S. 417 (1932).
6. For an opposing view see Freeman, Tax Accrual Accounting for Contested Items, 56 MIcH. L. REv. 727, 730 (1958).
7. See cases collected in 2 MERTENS, FEaAiL INCOME TAxATiON §12.103 (1961).
8. See 2 MERTENS, FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION §12.103 (1961).
9. 343 U.S. 130 (1952).
10. In Rutkin as in Wilcox the issue specifically stated by the Court was not
when but whether the illicit gain constituted taxable income. 343 U.S. at 131,
135, 138.
11. 343 U.S. at 137. (Emphasis added.) "Economic value" has long been
utilized by the courts in determining the taxability of gains, i.e., whether a gain
is taxable income. Its purpose is to circumvent legalistic concepts of ownership
and "title" in relation to taxation. See, e.g., Burnet v. Wells, 289 U.S. 670
(1933); Reinecke v. Smith, 289 U.S. 172 (1933); Corliss v. Bowers, 281 U.S. 376

(1930).
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in confusion and conflict in the lower courts regarding the taxability
of embezzled funds.12 The courts of appeal carefully distinguished
Wilcox in order to apply the reasoning of Rutkin.13 These cases
emphasized the need for clarifying the criteria to be applied in determining the taxability of embezzled funds.
James v. United States
In 1961 the conflict between Wilcox and Rutkin was finally laid
to rest in James v. United States.1 a The Supreme Court overruled
Wilcox, stating that Rutkin had "thoroughly devitalized" that decision.
The issue determined by the court in James was broader than
that in either Wilcox or Rutkin; it concerned not merely the taxability of embezzled funds but also when they are taxable. The Court
adopted the "economic value" test of Rutkin and the reasoning in
Commissioner v. Glenshaw Glass Co.1 that " 'accessions to wealth,
clearly realized, and over which the taxpayers have complete dominion'" constitute taxable income. 6 However, it relied upon the
"claim of right" doctrine of North American Oil 7 in holding that
the funds were taxable in the year of embezzlement.
Despite the certainty provided by the James decision, its holding
12. See, e.g., Macias v. Commissioner, 255 F.2d 23 (7th Cir. 1958); Davis v.
United States, 226 F.2d 331 (6th Cir. 1955); United States v. Bruswitz, 219 F.2d
59 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 349 U.S. 913 (1955); Marienfeld v. United States, 214
F.2d 632 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 348 U.S. 865 (1954); Kann v. Commissioner, 210
F.2d 247 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 347 U.S. 967 (1954). But see J. J. Dix, Inc. v.
Commissioner, 223 F.2d 436 (2d Cir. 1955).
13. E.g., Macias v. Commissioner, supra note 12 ("kickbacks"); Davis v. United
States, supra note 12 (sole shareholder cannot embezzle from his corporation);
United States v. Bruswitz, supra note 12 ("kickbacks"); Marienfeld v. United
States, supra note 12 (embezzlement of proceeds of contract sale); Kann v. Commissioner, supra note 12 (no external evidence of embezzlement; Wilcox was a
salaried employee, Kann was the controlling shareholder). But see J. J. Dix, Inc.
v. Commissioner, supra note 12 (followed Wilcox in case of controlling shareholder). See also Gelfand, "Wilcox" or "Rutkin"-Is the Fog Lifting?, 34 TAxas
109 (1956).
14. 366 U.S. 213 (1961).
15. 348 U.S. 426 (1955).
16. James v. United States, supra note 14, at 219. In Glenshaw Glass the
Court recognized "the intention of Congress to tax all gains except those specifically exempted." 348 U.S. at 430.
17. 286 U.S. 417 (1932). The Government contended in James that the "claim
of right" doctrine had been wrongfully applied in Wilcox, since the purpose of
that doctrine was to determine when, not whether, an item was taxable. The
Court refused to answer this contention, stating that "whatever its validity as a
test of whether certain receipts constitute income, [the claim of right test] calls
for no distinction between Wilcox and Rutkin." 366 U.S. 213, 216 n. 7 (1961).
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that an embezzler must pay federal income tax on his ill-gotten gains
in the year of embezzlement raises two problems. (1) If the embezzler repays the misappropriated funds in a later year, may he claim
a deduction in the amount of the repayment? (2) Should the federal
government's claim for taxes due on embezzled funds be superior
to the victim's right of repayment?
DEDUCTION FOR REPAYMENT

If the embezzler repays the misappropriated funds during the
year of embezzlement, no tax liability attaches; hence, there would be
no allowable deduction.' 8 As to repayments made in a subsequent
year, however, the United States Supreme Court in James said by way
of dictum that the embezzler is entitled to a deduction to the extent
of the repayment.' 9 But under what theory may such a deduction be
allowed?
United States v. Lewis, 20 decided in 1951, established the doctrine
that a person who repays money may take a deduction in the year of
repayment. Lewis had received a bonus of $22,000 in 1944 and had
reported it as income for that year. In 1946 an Illinois court found
that Lewis' bonus had been improperly computed, and under court
order he returned $11,000 to his employer. Lewis then filed a claim
for a refund of the tax paid on this amount in 1944. When his claim
was denied, he brought suit for the refund. 2' The Government contended that Lewis should have deducted the repayment from his
1946 income. 22 The lower court held that Lewis was entitled to have
a portion of his 1944 tax refunded, this refund to be based upon a
recomputation of his income for that year. The Supreme Court reversed, 23 holding that a taxpayer who previously paid taxes on funds
that were repaid in a subsequent year is not entitled to a refund
but may take a deduction in the year of repayment. The basis for the
policy of allowing this deduction seems to be that the taxpayer
should not be detrimentally treated. Although the allowance of a
deduction in the year of repayment may not completely offset the
economic hardship of the previously paid tax, it at least mitigates it.
18. See Charles Kay Bishop, 25 T.C. 969 (1956); Willis W. Clark, 11 T.C. 672
(1948); Albert W. Russell, 35 B.T.A. 602 (1937).
19. The Court's statement quoted the Government's brief, but neither the

Court nor the Government dted supporting authority.
20. 340 U.S. 590 (1951).
21. Lewis v. United States, 91 F. Supp. 1017 (Ct. Cl. 1950).
22.

See G.C.M. 16730, XV-l Cum. BULL. 179 (1936).

23. United States v. Lewis, 340 U.S. 590 (1951). The Court of Claims applied
the "claim of right" test of Wilcox in reaching its decision. The Supreme Court
disapproved this application and pointed out that "claim of right" should be
applied only to give finality to an annual accounting period. Id. at 592.
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Subsequent to the Lewis decision, Congress enacted section 1341
of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954. This section not only provides
for the allowance of a deduction in the year of repayment but also
gives the taxpayer the alternative of recomputing his income tax for
the prior year in which he received the money. 24 Would an embezzler
be able to take advantage of this section?
Even a casual reading of section 1341 indicates that it is inapplicable to a repaying embezzler. It never appears that the embezzler
"had an unrestricted right-25 to the money; he had no right to the
money at any time. 26 Although a repaying embezzler cannot look to
section 1341 for relief, he may still claim a deduction in the year of
repayment. Such a deduction would be allowed under the "common
law"27 of Lewis, which requires only the previous payment of income
tax.

PublicPolicy
The possible effect of "public policy" on the allowance of a deduction for repayment should also be considered. There are two sides to
the public policy argument: (1) The deduction should be allowed
to the embezzler as a means of encouraging restitution to the victim;
(2) the deduction should be disallowed on the ground that it would
benefit an admittedly disfavored person and would contravene the
public policy of punishing a criminal for his wrongdoing.
In Lilly v. Commissioner2s the United States Supreme Court held
that in order for public policy to be frustrated by allowance of a tax
deduction, the policy must be sharply defined and evidenced by
"some governmental declaration, ' '2 9 such as a legislative act proscribing specific conduct.8 0 It is therefore clear that a statute declaring
embezzlement a crime is such a governmental declaration. However,
for the deduction to frustrate the public policy, a relationship must
exist between the act proscribed and the payment for which the
24. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, §1341 (a) (5).
25. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 1341 (a) (1). (Emphasis added.)
26. See Spilky & Halprin, Embezzlers Have Tax Problems Too, 36 TAXES 798
(1958). The authors discuss the possibility of a §1341 treatment of repayment,
but they do not reach a definite conclusion as to its applicability to a repaying
embezzler.
27. There was no statutory law involved in the determination of this case.
28. 343 U.S. 90 (1952), 6 U. FLA. L. REV. 136 (1953).
29. 343 U.S. at 97.
30. Tank Truck Rentals, Inc. v. Commissioner, 356 U.S. 30 (1958), 11 U.
FLA. L. REV. 377; Hoover Motor Express Co. v. United States, 356 U.S. 38 (1958).
But see Commissioner v. Sullivan, 356 U.S. 27 (1958), decided the same day as
Tank Truck Rentals and Hoover Motor Express, but which seems to be irreconcilable with those cases.
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deduction is claimed. Based on public policy, expenditures directly
connected with illegal transactions are not deductible; 31 but the mere
fact that an expenditure is remotely related to an illegal act does
not make it non-deductible. 32 In Tank Truck Rentals v. Commissioner33 the Supreme Court stated that the expenditure would be
non-deductible if it were so closely related to the proscribed act that
allowance of the deduction would severely and immediately frustrate
the public policy.
In a recent case involving a bank manager who misappropriated
bank funds, the Tax Court held that his payments to indemnify the
bonding company were non-deductible because such a deduction
would frustrate public policy. 34 However, can it be said that repayment by the embezzler is so related to the crime of embezzlement that
allowance of a deduction severely and immediately frustrates public
policy? The repayment of embezzled funds is not in itself illegal; the
act proscribed by the governmental declaration is that of embezzlement, and the relationship between embezzlement and repayment is
a remote one at best. The allowance of a deduction for repayment
is not likely to encourage embezzlement; on the contrary, it would
support the public policy that demands restitution to the victim. 35
Federal tax policy encourages such general public policies. Of
special interest in this area are the tax policies evidenced by two
revenue rulings36 allowing the deduction of funds repaid pursuant
to statute. 37 By allowing deductions, these rulings encourage repayment and consequently strengthen public policy. It may be contended
that they support the allowance of a deduction for repaid embezzled
funds.
It is submitted that the policy favoring restitution is worthy of
support by taxing authorities. An embezzler is punished by imprisonment for his act against society; there is no need for further "punishment" by disallowing a deduction for his repayment.
31. E.g., Israel Silberman, 44 B.T.A. 600 (1941) (expenses connected with
gambling enterprise); H. S. Anderson, 35 B.T.A. 10 (1936) (illegal gambling
losses not allowed to offset gambling gains derived legally).
32. E.g., Commissioner v. Heininger, 820 U.S. 467, 474 (1943) (dictum),
cited with approval in Tank Truck Rentals v. Commissioner, supra note 30, at
35; J. Rossman Corp. v. Commissioner, 175 F.2d 711 (2d Cir. 1949); RCA Communications, Inc. v. United States, 277 F.2d 164 (Ct. Cl. 1960); see Rev. Rul. 54-204,
1954-1 CuM. BuLL. 49.

33. 356 U.S. 30 (1958).
34. Nicholas D. Wusich, 35 T.C. 279 (1960).
35. The victim can maintain an action for conversion of the money. 53
AM. JUR. Trover & Conversion §§8, 24 (1945).

36. Rev. Rul. 54-204, 1954-1 CuM. BULL. 49; Rev. Rul 61-115, 1961-1 CUM.
BuLL. 46.

37. The Emergency Price Control Act of 1942, §205 (e), 56 Stat. 23, 34 (1942),
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The decision that embezzled funds are taxable income gives rise
to a possible conflict between the victim's right to repayment and
the federal government's claim for taxes. Which of these parties
should have priority as to the embezzler's assets when they are not
sufficient to meet both claims? Mr. Justice Murphy, speaking for the
majority in Wilcox, felt that the victim should prevail and should not
be required to compete with the Government. 38 The Court, therefore, precluded any governmental tax claim by holding embezzled
funds to be non-taxable. This view was again expressed by the dis3 9
senters in James.
When the assets of the embezzler are insufficient to meet both
claims, the Government's claim for taxes may be exerted by invoking
the general priority statute,4 0 or acquiring a tax lien on the property
of the taxpayer, 41 or both.
Relative Rights Under the General Priority Statute
The general priority statute gives the United States first claim
against the assets of the tax debtor when he is "insolvent.",' 2 Mere inability of the debtor to pay his debts does not constitute insolvency
within the meaning of this statute. There must be a voluntary assignment of the debtor's property, an attachment of his property, or
an act of bankruptcy. 43 If the victim has not obtained a judgment
50 U.S.C. (App.) §925 (e) (1958), and the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, §16 (b),
48 Stat. 896 (1934), 15 U.S.C. §7 9 p (1958), require the repayment of funds that
the recipient was not entitled to retain.
38. 327 U.S. 404, 410 (1946). Mr. Justice Burton, dissenting, argued that the
possibility of such a conflict was no reason to hold the embezzled funds nontaxable, but was rather "an argument for Congress to modify the tax lien in
favor of the victim." Id. at 414.
39. 366 U.S. 213, 227 (Black, J.), 252 & n.4 (Whittaker, J.).
40. RaV. STAT. §3466 (1875), 31 U.S.C. §191 (1958) (hereafter referred to as
the general priority statute): "Whenever any person indebted to the United
States is insolvent . . . the debts due to the United States shall be first satisfied
" Taxes
- due the United States have been held to be "debts" within the meaning of this statute. Price v. United States, 269 U.S. 492 (1926).
41. INT. RFV. CODE OF 1954, §§6321-23 (hereafter referred to as the tax lien
statute).

42. REV. STAT. §3466 (1875), 31 U.S.C. §191 (1958): "[T]he priority established
shall extend as well to cases in which a debtor, not having sufficient property
to pay all his debts, makes a voluntary assignment thereof, or in which the estate
and effects of an absconding, concealed, or absent debtor are attached by process
of law, as to cases in which an act of bankruptcy is committed." (Emphasis added.)
43. Conard v. Atlantic Ins. Co., 26 U.S. (1 Pet.) 386, 438-39 (1828). This
statute is not applicable in bankruptcy proceedings. Bankruptcy laws provide for
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NOTES
lien against the property of the embezzler prior to "insolvency," the
Government's claim will prevail by virtue of the priority statute. But
if the victim has obtained a judgment lien, who will prevail?
In Spokane County v. United States44 the Supreme Court held
that the general priority statute gives a federal tax debt priority over
debts prior in time, even though these debts are secured by inchoate,
general liens. Inchoate liens are not specific or perfected, because one
or more of the following requirements are lacking: (1) The amount
of the lien is undetermined, (2) the identity of the lienor is unsettled, (3) the steps necessary to enforce the lien have not been
taken, or (4) no specific property to which the lien may attach has
been segregated from other assets. 45 The United States Supreme
Court has consistently adhered to the doctrine of the "inchoate, general lien" since the Spokane County case; these liens, therefore, have
been held to be inferior to claims of the United States.46
Mr. Justice Cardozo, speaking for the Court in New York v.
Maclay47 suggested that the general priority statute might permit a
federal tax claim to prevail over a specific and perfected lien.4 8 The
Court has stated several times that it has not been confronted with
a prior specific and perfected lien opposed to the federal government's
claim under the general priority statute; it has, therefore, never decided which would prevail. 49
other priorities that preempt the general priority statute. 52 Stat. 874 (1938),
11 U.S.C. §104 (1958); In re Taylorcraft Aviation Corp., 168 F.2d 808 (6th Cir.
1948); United States v. Sampsell, 153 F.2d 731 (9th Cir. 1946).
44. 279 U.S. 80 (1929).
45.

Sarner, Correlationof Priority and Lien Rights in the Collection of Federal

Taxes, 95 PA. L. R~v. 739 (1946). Whether a lien is inchoate and general or
specific and perfected for purposes of the general priority statute is a federal
question. United States v. Security Trust & Say. Bank, 340 U.S. 47 (1950); United
States v. Waddill, Holland & Flinn, Inc., 232 U.S. 353 (1945).
46. E.g., United States v. New Britain, 347 U.S. 81 (1954); United States v.
Gilbert Associates, Inc., 345 U.S. 361 (1953); United States v. Texas, 314 U.S. 480
(1941). In Gilbert Associates the Court carried the doctrine of the inchoate, general lien to its extreme, stating that "'specificity' of a lien requires that the lien
be attached to certain property by reducing it to possession .......

(Emphasis

added.)
47. 288 U.S. 290, 293 (1933) (dictum).
48. By way of dictum in United States v. Knott, 298 U.S. 544, 551 (1936), the
Court said that an inchoate, general lien lacked the characteristics of a specific
perfected lien, which "alone bars the priority of the United States." (Emphasis

added.) The plain meaning of these words was later specifically denied by the
Court in Illinois ex rel. Gordon v. Campbell, 329 U.S. 362 (1946); it said that the
above quotation was not intended to settle the question whether a specific perfected lien would overcome the priority established by the general priority statute,
Id. at 370 n.10.
49. See, e.g., United States v. Gilbert Associates, Inc., supra note 46; Illinois
ex rel. Gordon v. Campbell, supra note 48; United States v. Texas, 314 U.S. 480
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To obtain a specific and perfected lien, the victim must proceed
as rapidly as possible to secure a judgment against the embezzler; he
must then record this judgment and, if possible, obtain execution
before the embezzler becomes "insolvent." If he fails to do so, the
Government's claim for taxes will be superior. However, even if the
victim follows this course of action, the Supreme Court might still
hold, in accordance with Mr. Justice Cardozo's suggestion, that the
general priority statute gives the federal tax claim priority over that
of the victim.
Relative Rights Under the Tax Lien Statute
The Government can exert its claim by means of a tax lien,50
which may be utilized concurrently with the general priority statute
when the tax debtor is "insolvent." This lien attaches to the property
of the taxpayer when he neglects or refuses to pay the tax after a
demand has been made. 51 Although the lien is established only after
demand, it relates back to the date of assessment.5 2 Since neither assessment nor demand is an event of public record, the tax lien constitutes a "secret" lien as to other creditors of the tax debtor. 53 For
the purpose of this note, it is assumed that a tax lien has attached
(1941). In United States v. New Britain, 347 U.S. 81 (1954), the Court finally
found a specific and perfected lien, but it was dealing with the tax lien statute,
not the general priority statute.
50. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, §6321: "If any person liable to pay any tax
neglects or refuses to pay the same after demand, the amount . . . shall be a lien
in favor of the United States upon all property ... belonging to such person."
51. Ibid. The "demand" referred to in the Code need not be a formal demand, but need merely be sufficient to place the taxpayer on notice of the tax
claim. See 9 MERTENS,

FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION

§54.41 (1958).

52. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, §6322. Following is a brief chronological resum6
of the general procedures leading to establishment of the tax lien. First, a statutory notice of deficiency must be sent to the taxpayer before assessment of a tax
deficiency or collection thereof. INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, §§6212 (a), 6213 (a); Treas.
Reg. §§301.6212-1, 301.6213-1 (a) (2). But see INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, §§6213 (d),
6861 (a), 6871 (a), 7485, for exceptions to this requirement. Second, after the deficiency notice has been sent, there can be no assessment, levy, or collection proceeding for at least 90 days; and if the taxpayer files a petition for redetermination
with the Tax Court within that period, no such action can be taken until the decision of the Tax Court is final. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § §6213 (a), (c). See also
id., §§6214 (c), 7481. Third, when the Tax Court decision has become final, assessment of the deficiency can be made as redetermined by the Tax Court. INT. REV.
CODE OF 1954, §6215(a). See also id., §§6214(c), 7481, 7485, 6203; Treas. Reg.
§301.6203-1. Fourth, after the assessment, the district director must give notice to
the taxpayer and demand payment of the unpaid tax. INT. REv. CODE OF 1954,
§6203 (a). When the taxpayer neglects or refuses to pay the tax demanded, the tax
lien arises and relates back to the date of the assessment.
53. 9 MERTENs, FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION §54.40 (1958).
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to the property of the embezzler. 54 It should be noted that the embezzler does not have title to the embezzled funds; therefore, a tax
lien will not attach to that money. 55
The tax lien is effective against the rights of mortgagees, pledgees,
purchasers, and judgment creditors only if notice has been filed
prior to the vesting of those rights. 56 As to other prior liens, the
United States Supreme Court has applied the "inchoate, general lien"
doctrine.5 7 Thus, the victim faces the same difficulty in establishing
his right to repayment under the tax lien statute that he does under
the general priority statute. When there is a specific and perfected
lien opposing the tax lien, relative
rights are determined on the basis
5' 8
of "first in time, first in right."
At the time the tax lien is established the Government can collect
the unpaid tax by levying directly upon the property of the taxpayer
or filing an action for enforcement of the lien. 59 If the Government
levies upon the embezzler's property, the victim may have little opportunity to oppose the claim.60 Depending on the Government's
course of action, the victim must either argue his claim in the lienenforcement action or bring suit to enjoin the levy and consequent
tax sale.61
Unless the victim can establish himself as a "judgment creditor"
prior to the filing of the tax lien notice,62 the Government will prevail in its claim for taxes. The regulations define a judgment creditor
54. For detailed treatment of the intricacies and technicalities involved in
perfecting the tax lien, see generally 9 MERTENS, FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION §§54.38.66 (1958); Clark, Federal Tax Liens and Their Enforcement, 33 VA. L. REv. 13
(1947); Sarner, Correlationof Priority and Lien Rights in the Collection of Federal
Taxes, 95 PA. L. Rxv. 739 (1946).
55. See 9 MaRTENS, FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION §54.52 (1958, Supp. 1961). The

Government's rights in establishing its lien on property of a delinquent taxpayer
are no better than the taxpayer's rights, and the embezzler never had title or
other property right in the embezzled money. Ibid. See also INT. REV. CoDE OF
1954, §6321.
56. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, §6323. See also Treas. Reg. §301.6323-1 for
methods of filing the notice.
57. E.g., United States v. Hulley, 358 U.S. 66 (1958), reversing 102 So. 2d 599
(Fla. 1958); United States v. Gilbert Associates, Inc., 345 U.S. 361 (1953); United
States v. Security Trust & Sav. Bank, 340 U.S. 47, 53 (1950) (concurring opinion).
58. United States v. New Britain, 347 U.S. 81, 87 (1954).
59. INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, §§6331, 7403. The conditions precedent to both
these actions are generally the same. See note 52 supra.
60. In the case of a levy, notification of sale must be published, INT. RFv. CODE
OF 1954, §6335 (b), but publication might be unnoticed by the victim. In a lienenforcement action INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, §7403 (b) requires that all persons
having liens or claiming any interest in the property involved be made parties.
61. See note 60 supra. If the victim has attached property or obtained execution, the property is not subject to levy. INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, §6332 (a).
62. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, §6323. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. §55.10 (1961) for
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as "a person who has obtained a valid judgment in a court of record
and of competent jurisdiction for the recovery of specifically designated property or for a certain sum of money and, in the case of a
judgment for the recovery of a certain sum of money, who has a per3
The
fected lien under such judgment on the property involved."
United States Supreme Court has defined "judgment creditor" as a
holder "of a judgment of a court of record" in the "usual conventional

sense." 6 4 This definition is less stringent than that of the regulations,
since it does not expressly require a perfected lien and seems to be
65
more in accord with the statute.

The victim's best course of action, as under the general priority
statute, is to obtain a judgment against the embezzler, record it, and,
if possible, obtain execution prior to the Government's filing of
notice of its tax lien.
CONCLUSION

Whether an embezzler should be allowed a deduction for repayment to the victim and whether the victim can prevail over the
Government in his claim against the embezzler are questions that
are indirectly related. As to the former, the best tax policy would
be to allow the deduction, since it would encourage repayment; this
would lend support to the public policy that demands restitution.
However, this policy of restitution is greatly hampered by the provisions of the general priority and lien statutes. Under present law,
the victim must become a judgment lien holder prior to the embezzler's "insolvency" or before the Government files its notice of tax
lien. Even as a judgment lien holder, the victim is not completely
assured of recovery; and, as pointed out by Mr. Justice Douglas, dissenting in James, he will have a "rocky road" to travel. Congress
should heed Mr. Justice Burton's suggestion in Wilcox by modifying
the priority and lien laws to favor the victim. Congress would thus
provide laws consistent with the public policy demanding restitution.
These laws, in conjunction with the tax policy allowing a deduction
for repayment, would go far toward ultimate restoration of the victim's loss.
JAMES

H.

GILBERT, JR.

provisions regarding the method of perfecting a judgment lien.
63. Treas. Reg. §301.6323-1. (Emphasis added.)
64. United States v. Gilbert Associates, Inc., 345 U.S. 361, 364 (1953). See also
United States v. Security Trust & Say. Bank, 340 U.S. 47, 52 (1950) (concurring
opinion).
65. See INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, §6323.
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